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I am pleased to have been given the opportunity to comment on Fabio Paglieri’s richly
textured and well-argued paper. Concerning its main theme, there is little of consequence
with which I disagree. Perhaps the best use of my role is to add some supplementary
remarks designed to lend support to Paglieri’s approach.
1. CHARITY
The Principle Charity has had a checkered history. Originally the coinage of N.L. Wilson
(1959), it played a glancing role in Quine’s proposal for handling the indeterminacy of
radical translation (1960) and was given fuller articulation in Davidson’s approach to the
interpretation of alien tongues (1984). Thomas brought it closer to home, and made it a
principle of argument-assessment in domestic languages (1977). Scriven gave it much the
same providence (1976). Notwithstanding the common thread that runs through their
conceptions of it, Thomas and Scriven apply the principle to somewhat different cases.
With Thomas, the case is one in which there is some doubt as to whether a text should be
interpreted as an argument. Charity here decrees that if interpreting it so makes it a bad
argument it is best to consider that it is not an argument at all. In the cases considered by
Scriven, Charity obliges us to withhold any interpretation which makes an argument a
bad argument, save as a last resort. In other places, Scriven’s admonition is much
slighter, scarcely more than that arguments should not be interpreted unfairly. As it
happens, for all its apparent triviality, this second version of Scriven’s Charity contains
an important insight, as we shall shortly see.
Let me now say a brief word or two about the Quine-Davidson project. Quine and
Davidson are interested in general schemes of translation from wholly new languages to
the translator’s own. By the construction of the case, the translator has nothing to go on
but the linguistic behaviour – some of it induced by the translator’s gestures and
inflections – of alien speakers, together with what he, the translator, knows of the world
in general. Since there is a big gap between behaviour and meaning, the translator’s
problem is imbued with radical indeterminacy.
It is important to notice that what the translator seeks is a knowledge of utterancemeaning. He wants to know whether “Gavagai” means “Lo! a rabbit”. The translator’s
target is not speaker-meaning, except in a quite ancillary way. “Gavagai” gets mapped to
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“Lo! a rabbit” by what Quine calls a translation manual. Davidson imposes on translation
manuals the general constraint that they not typically map sentences of the native
language to false sentences of the translator’s own; in particular, that they not do so with
regard to that very large class of sentences whose truth values would be commonly
known to competent individuals anywhere. In other words, one’s translation manual must
not make massive ignoramuses of native speakers. This reflects the twofold assumption
that people everywhere have a stake in speaking truthfully in the general case and they
have more or less equal access to the basic facts of human experience. Speakers enter this
picture in two ways. They are generators of linguistic behaviour and they are a fulcrum
for the leverage secured by Davidson’s constraint on translation manuals.
Let us say that a speaker-intention problem is a triple 〈S, U, M〉, in which S is
what a speaker means in making an utterance U, M is what U means and S and M are not
the same. A solution of a speaker-intention problem is the specification of a meaning M′
which is the same as S. For the most part, there is a weak compatibility between M′ and
M; M′ neither implies nor is implied by M. 1 Our question is how, if at all, the Principle of
Charity plays a role in specifying M′ . Davidson and Quine take it for granted that by and
large what a speaker means in uttering U is what the utterance U means. Accordingly, in
the general case, a translation manual will usually tell us what a speaker means just by
telling us what his utterance means.
A translation manual does not tell us what speakers mean in uttering a U with
meaning M, when M is not what the speaker means. It tells us what U means in the
translator’s language. Reconciling speaker-meaning with utterance-meaning is not a
translator’s task. Ascribing to human beings a common interest in truth-telling and a
common facility in recognizing the true is a claim about what human beings are like (and
are good at) in the general case. This may be good or bad anthropology, but it is certainly
not charity. In judging yon native to be like me in these respects, I am not being nice to
him. I am showing that I know what human beings are like.
In the hands of Thomas and Scriven, Charity has the look of a principle of
argument assessment. Its providence differs in two main respects from that of the QuineDavidson variant. It applies to intra-linguistic speech, and so is not a principle of
translation. It also applies to arguments one by one. What Charity now commands is that
for any given argument in the appraiser’s own language, it not be given an interpretation
on which it is a bad argument, except as a last resort (Scriven). It takes no effort to see
that this is absurdly promiscuous.
Quine-Davidson Charity makes the sensible assumption that natives aren’t nontrivially worse at getting at the truth of the usual run of things and drawing appropriate
conclusions from them than we ourselves are. So it lies in the spirit of Quine-Davidson
that we not accede to Thomas-Scriven. Doing so would, in the particular case of
argument-making, make us all much better at it than we have any reason to believe
ourselves to be. Better, then, to restore the Quine-Davidson feature which makes Charity
a principle of interpretation, not a principle of assessment, roughly as follows:

It is not an unvarying condition, however, that M′ be compatible with M. As any married couple will
know, Sarah’s utterance of “No, I’m not tired; let’s stay a while longer” may well assert “I am ready to
drop. For God’s sake let’s dump this place!”
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Interpretation: Let I be an interpretation manual for language L. Then if under I
arguments in general turn out to have a particularly high failure-rate then I is not
a satisfactory manual.
A bad interpretation manual will, among other things, mistakenly compel faulty
assessments of arguments. Charity tells us to reject such manuals, but it does not tell us
how to recognize the goodness of a given good argument when interpreted as a
satisfactory manual would provide. Suppose, then, that my interpretation manual is tested
against a very large representative sample of arguments in English. Charity says that I
must give it up if failure is too widely distributed at too high a frequency in this sample.
By what means am I to determine whether this distribution and frequency of error is too
high? For this I will need a separate procedure, perhaps itself regulated by its own version
of Charity. At this juncture, assessment manuals re-enter the picture, and Charity
provides that
Assessment: If an assessment manual generates an unduly high frequency and
wide distribution of argumentional failures, it is the wrong manual.
Charity, whether Quine’s or Davidson’s or Thomas’s or Scriven’s, is not a theological
virtue, 2 but a generalization to the effect that human beings are better at arguing than not.
It goes without saying that this new version of Charity – indeed of the induction it
embeds – may well be the subject of vigorous contention, especially among scepticallyminded philosophers. This is not my concern here. It will be enough to consider a case.
Suppose that one’s assessment manual finds fault with any argument that is
invalid and/or inductively frail. What I mean here by invalidity what deductive logicians
mean by it, and by inductive weakness is what inductive logicians mean by it. Deductive
validity gives truth-preservation and inductive strength gives degrees of confirmation
required for lawlike pronouncements of experimental/statistical reasoning. Suppose our
assessment manual provides that these errors occur with very high frequency and in very
wide distributions. Then, by the version of Charity presently in view, we would have to
give up on that manual (which in the present situation is precisely the right ruling). Why
is it the right ruling? Two facts make it so.
Fact 1: Faulty argumentation is not especially frequent or widely distributed in
the argument practices of human reasoners.
Fact 2: Most arguments made by human reasoners are neither valid nor
inductively strong.
The two versions of Charity now fall into fruitful concurrence. Since a good assessment
manual will not as a general policy find fault with an argument on account of its
invalidity or inductive weakness, it is necessary that our interpretation manual not assign
to such arguments interpretations which motivate validity or inductive strength as
legitimate general expectations. Accordingly, the conclusion-indicator “so” should
2

Although the other two lie closer to it. Thomas-Scriven Charity compels us to see real life argumentation
as instantiating the Goody Two-Shoes Model, concerning which see, e.g., Gabbay and Woods (2001).
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typically not be read as indicating either deductive or inductive consequence. It is here
that we have an echo of Scriven’s slighter principle, which says that one should not
interpret arguments unfairly. Since most good arguments are neither valid nor inductively
strong in the logician’s technical senses of these terms, they should not be interpreted in
ways that tie their goodness to these unrealistic standards. Doing so would be “unfair”.
This brings me to the end of section 1. But before closing, it is necessary to point
out that, if it is a fact that most good arguments made by real-life individuals are neither
valid nor inductively strong, it is a fact recognized by the Quine-Davidson principle of
Charity, but it is a fact explained by the cognitive make-up of individual reasoners, on
which Fabio Paglieri lays rightful emphasis. Given what beings like us are interested in
and good at, validity and inductive strength are rarely the right standards. For one thing,
most of the things that we have an interest in knowing are not (pace the deductivists)
validly deducible from what we already know. For another, even where validity is rightly
not the requisite standard, it is hardly ever the case that the real-life individual has either
the wherewithal or the need to hold his ampliative reasonings to the tough standards of
experimental/statistical rigour necessary for successful drug-safety trials at Health
Canada; so inductive strength is hardly ever the right standard either. It is therefore an
attractive coincidence that the fact explained by our resource-bound cognitive agency is
the norm mandated by Quine-Davidson Charity, never mind that they probably wouldn’t
have realized it.
2. ENTHYMEMES
If we take Aristotle as our guide, we see that
The Enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the
normal syllogism. For if any of those propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to
mention it; the hearer adds it himself. (Rhetoric, I, 2, 1357a, 16-19)

This being so, there are no enthymeme-resolution problems. There is nothing to resolve.
The missing proposition is so familiar that there is no need to mention it. It is so familiar
that the hearer is able simply to add it.
Some will think that the wording of this passage from Aristotle leaves it open that
there could be enthymemes whose missing parts lack the familiarity that would make it
unnecessary to either mention or add them. If such there be, wouldn’t they present
genuine enthymeme-resolution problems? I think not. If they did, the problem would still
be to produce a syllogism from an enthymeme. Enthymemes are special cases of nonsyllogisms. In the case (usually considered paradigmatic) of a single missing premiss, an
enthymeme has all the features of a syllogism consistent with that omission. Its contained
premiss and conclusion contain the requisite number of terms, distributed in the
appropriate way and preceded by the right quantifiers. Consider, for concreteness, the
following enthymeme
All men are mortal
So, Socrates is mortal.
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There is no more than one (non-equivalent) way of making a syllogism out of this. The
missing premiss is
Socrates is a man
concerning which there are two points of familiarity. One is that Socrates’ humanity is a
familiar fact. The other is that anyone familiar with the construction of syllogisms will
know that this is the proposition to choose. Accordingly, even if a missing premiss is not
a familiar fact in the first sense, anyone familiar with the structure of syllogisms will
select it. 3
Considered as non-syllogisms that are as close to being syllogisms as is consistent
with their missing a premiss, enthymemes present no resolution problems. Accordingly,
there is no need for Charity under any interpretation of it in which it is an enthymemeproblem resolution strategy.
“Ah, yes”, I can hear it being muttered. “This is all very well when enthymemes
are taken in Aristotle’s way. When they are taken in Aristotle’s way, they come with so
many structural cues that filling the gap is “a matter of course” (in Peirce’s words about
another matter). But what if they are taken in the modern way?” Very well; let’s take
them in that way. Let us say that an enthymeme is an invalid argument which is as close
to being valid as is consistent with the omission of a single premiss. For generality, let
A1
∶

An
B
be any such argument. If the task before us is to convert this non-validity to a validity by
the addition of a premiss, perhaps the obvious choice is to add the argument’s
corresponding conditional
If A1 ∧ … ∧ An, then B. 4
It is well to note that there are no prior constraints on the selection of the missing premiss
save that it validate the original. There is no requirement that the selected premiss be the
logically simplest validator or that it not be question-begging, or whatever else. However,
if we wanted to recover something of the spirit of the original meaning of “enthymeme”,
premiss-selection would be expected to meet a familiarity condition. And it does. Anyone
familiar with the structure of modern validity will know that ┌If A1 ∧… ∧ An, then B┓

3

As witness any enthymeme lacking in familiar propositional content: 〈“All glerks are glark”/“Zonk is
glark”〉, whose missing premiss can only be “Zonk is a glerk”.
4
For one thing – to make a pragmatic point – anyone sincerely but incorrectly forwarding this argument as
valid is, just so, committed to its corresponding conditional, if anything like a Deduction Metatheorem
holds for natural languages.
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validates 〈 A1 ∧ … ∧ An /B〉, for any Ai and B. In other words, they know that modus
ponens is a valid rule. Indeed it is the paradigmatically valid rule.
Of course, there is a problem with this. It provides that every invalid argument
whatever has a valid completion. This being so, it would appear that we lack a principled
distinction between an invalid argument made so by a missing premiss and an invalid
argument whose premisses are all present and accounted for. From this we may think it
necessary to require that, whatever the details, an invalid argument is an enthymeme only
if it has a valid completion by a method that fails to validate every invalid argument. 5
Were it otherwise, we would lose the distinction between enthymemes and invalid
arguments. Every invalid argument would be an enthymeme.
Still, banning the corresponding conditional as a completing premiss in any
invalid argument denies us the comforts of modus ponens. Since this would be excessive,
we have now handed ourselves the further challenge of determining in a principled way
when the activation of modus ponens is an acceptable means of dealing with an
enthymeme and when not. So our list of problems has grown to two:
Problem one: determining when an invalid argument is an enthymeme
Problem two: determining when it is allowable that an enthymeme’s proper
completion instantiates modus ponens.
Various additional constraints might be considered. One is to restrict the selection of
corresponding conditionals to those that happen to be true. But this won’t do as a general
requirement. Any case in which the premisses of the enthymeme are all true and the
conclusion false is one in which the corresponding conditional cannot be true. Since such
cases are the most direct demonstrations of the enthymeme’s invalidity, they are also the
most direct demonstration that the true-corresponding-conditional rule is not consistently
meetable rule in all cases.
Sometimes it is all right to complete an argument with its corresponding
conditional, and sometimes not. This is of some help to us, but not much. Can we do
better than this tentative romp down the via negativa? Let us see.
In the literature there is widespread acceptance, largely tacit, of the following
correspondence:
Good completions as validating: A good enthymeme-completion selection will be
a premiss that validates it.
Upon reflection, this cannot be true, as witness the following case:
If A then B
So, A

5

We see in this restriction the influence of what we might call the Principle of Converse Charity. It
provides that, if the means used in a given case to rescue an argument by furnishing a validating premises
would, if made a general policy, rescue every valid argument, then it should be suppressed in that given
case.
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Transparently invalid, it would also appear to be missing a premiss. Pretty clearly, this is
a truncated version of Affirming the Consequent. If so, there can be no mystery about the
premiss that completes it. The missing premiss is B; but upon addition, we transform an
incomplete invalid argument into a complete invalid argument. What this tells us that
traditional approaches to enthymemes conflate two quite different tasks. One is the task
of spotting a premiss that completes an incomplete argument. The other is the task of
finding a premiss that will validate it. We now have reason to regret that the tradition has
run these features together. Better that we free the idea of enthymeme from the idea that
completion is a validity-restorer. Better that enthymemes be incomplete arguments
independently of their assessment-status after completion.
In light of our findings in section 1, this is a hugely liberating reorientation of a
traditional muddle. Since it is not typical of real-life arguments that they are properly
bound to the validity standard, it can hardly be typical of real-life enthymemes that they
be properly completeable only by premisses that validate them. And if we generalize on
our example of the incomplete instance of Affirming the Consequent, we have more
liberation still.
Good completions/bad arguments: It cannot be typical of enthymemes that they be
properly completable only by premiss that make them good arguments, in
whatever sense of good fits the particular case.
It is well to note that this is liberation that conclusively puts paid to Thomas-Scriven
Charity as anything approaching a plausible general policy for enthymeme-completion.
Completion is not amelioration. Completion is completion. Aristotle thinks that we all
know how to do that as a matter of course. Paglieri thinks, and I agree, that the reason
that incomplete argumentation is so prevalent in actual practice is that, since Aristotle is
right about our facility at completion, it is more economical for us to proceed in this way,
that it is a more prudent expenditure of cognitive resources made scant by our quite
general bounded rationality. Paglieri also thinks, and I agree, that much of the time, if not
typically, our knowing how to complete an incomplete communication is tacit, and that
its tacity is often as much a trait of the communication’s sender as its receiver. If this is
right, it is a further thing that it is explained by the fact that we must all make our way in
cognitive ecologies characterized by comparative resource-paucity. But if these things are
indeed right, we must take seriously the suggestion that,
Good incomplete arguments: Just as some incomplete arguments are, in that very
state, bad in ways that their proper completion will preserve, so too are some
incomplete arguments are, in that very state, good in ways that their proper
completions will also preserve.
This lends substantial support to Paglieri’s ecological explanation of the frequency of
incomplete communications in real-life conditions. Not only are they cheaper to produce
and process, these are large ranges of cases in which they are not improved upon by their
completions.
Here is yet another reason to think that Thomas-Scriven Charity is just wrong for
enthymeme-completion. But it is also a reason that blunts the force of Quine-Davidson
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Charity. Quine-Davidson Charity requires that in the process of completion we not
transform good arguments into bad ones. But, as we have it now, Quine-Davidson
Charity is, for those large ranges of cases, not an applicable rule. For nothing is gained by
the completions that it purports to regulate. I conclude, then, that when it comes to
dealing with enthymemes, Paglieri’s thesis that – depending upon the version of it that
one has in mind – Charity has only an attenuated role (Quine-Davidson) or none at all
(Thomas-Scriven) is deeply correct.
link to response

link to paper
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